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Using a broad-based sample of small businesses, we analyze the relation between accountingbased firm performance measures and executive compensation for S-corporations, and Ccorporations. After controlling for the potential endogeneity associated with the choice of
organizational form, we find a positive relation between executive pay and ROA in Scorporations and C-corporations. We also find a positive relation between executive pay and
total asset turnover but the relation is stronger for S-corporations. We document a positive
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relation between executive salaries and more diffuse ownership, owner managers, and when the
founder is the current owner. We find a negative relation between executive salaries and firms
with greater than fifty percent family ownership.
I.

Introduction and motivation
Executive compensation issues attract attention in both the academic and political
arenas. Much of the public interest focuses on escalating compensation for CEOs of publicly
traded companies with an increased divergence in pay between CEOs and lower level
employees. As described by Murphy (1999), the academic literature has evolved primarily
because of the emergence and general acceptance of agency theory and the increased
accessibility to executive compensation data. In general, studies find that compensation
increases with firm size and executive compensation is positively related to firm performance
(e.g., Lewellen and Huntsman, 1970; Ciscel and Carroll, 1980; Murphy, 1985), although the
economic magnitude of the change in pay relative to performance has been questioned (Jensen
and Murphy, 1990). In addition, studies have focused on firm characteristics that impact both
compensation levels and compensation structure (e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and
Gaver, 1993).
The current compensation literature focuses on large, publicly traded firms. For the
most part, a void exists in the literature regarding small firm compensation practices, partially
due to the difficulty in obtaining data on compensation in small, privately held firms. Also,
small firms tend to have less pronounced agency problems since many small firms have
owner/managers. Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b) argue that the residual claims of privately
held firms are largely restricted to owner/managers or to agents, such as family members or
business associates, with a special relationship with the owner. Therefore, they argue that
agency problems between owners and managers may be mitigated in privately held firms.
However, not all privately held firms are run by owner/managers in which case the agency
problems may still exist with a need for owners to monitor management (e.g., Ang, Cole and
Lin, 2000).
Only recently has research begun to focus on closely held firms and the unique
incentive problems they may face. For example. Bates, Jandik and Lehn (2000) analyze the
promotion incentives (tournament theory) and executive compensation of executives in familycontrolled public firms and find that non-family executives in family owned firms are faced
with diminished promotion incentives. In their study of publicly-traded and privately-held
property-liability insurance companies, Ke et al. (1999) find a positive, significant relation
between CEO pay and ROA in publicly-traded insurers but the relation is insignificant for
privately-held insurers. They conclude that privately-held insurers do not rely on compensation
contracts linking pay to accounting based performance to mitigate agency problems but instead
may rely on direct monitoring combined with subjective performance measurement.
Focusing on privately-held small C corporations, Cavalluzzo and Sankaraguruswamy
(2005) find evidence that executive compensation is more closely related to sales to assets in
privately-held small corporations with more disperse ownership than those with more
concentrated ownership. They also find that the sensitivity o f compensation to sales to assets is
weaker if the firm is a family owned business and the manager is a shareholder.
The goal of this paper is to analyze the unique issues faced by small firms that are
organized as C-corporations and S-corporations. These organizational forms differ in their
ownership structures, tax treatment, and in the type of agency problems they face. Specifically,
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we analyze the factors that influence the compensation structure of small firms while
considering the intra-dependence between the choice of organizational form and the optimal
structure of compensation contracts.
Our paper differs from Cavalluzzo and Sankaraguruswamy (2005) in the following
ways. First, we analyze both S and C Corporations and restrict our sample to firms with less
diffuse ownership. Specifically, we exclude C corporations (approximately five percent of the
C-corporate sample observations) with more than thirty shareholders. Our goal is to compare
small firm compensation practices while controlling for diffuse ownership of C corporations.
Second, when we investigate the relation between executive pay and different accounting based
firm performance measures for privately held firms, we control for the potential endogeneity
associated with the choice to organize as an S-corporation and a C-corporation and
compensation practices using two stage least squares.
We conduct our tests on the data from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business
Finances (NSSBF) sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board and the Small Business
Administration. The survey is of a nationally representative sample of small businesses with
less than 500 employees and contains 4,637 usable survey responses (according to
PriceWaterhouse). Specifically, we analyze S-corporations and privately-held C-corporations.^
Consistent with previous studies of large publicly traded companies, we find a positive
relation between firm size and executive salaries for our full sample of privately-held firms.
We also find a positive relation between executive salaries and return on assets independent of
organizational form. Decomposing return on assets into profit margin and total asset turnover,
we find a positive relation between executive salaries and total asset turnover. However, when
we interact corporate form with total asset turnover, the result suggests that C corporations pay
less for the efficient use of assets relative to S corporations. Therefore, our results are more
consistent with Holmstrom’s (1979) second best solution to the contracting problem which
suggests using imperfect estimators of an agent's actions when complete monitoring is
impossible or prohibitively costly. In the case of S corporations and C corporations, total asset
turnover appears to be the better proxy for cash flows available to owners than ROA, which is
more typically used for large publicly traded firms, even after controlling for owner managers,
family ownership and diffuse ownership. Our results differ firom Ke, et.al. (1999) who find that
privately-held insurers do not rely on compensation contracts linking pay to accounting based
performance to mitigate agency problems. It may be that agency costs and/or information
asymmetry problems are less severe in the insurance industry and thus, Ke, et. al.’s findings
can not be generalized to a broad based sample of privately held small firms.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss the characteristics of
different organizational forms and the implications with respect to compensation practices. In
Section III, we describe the data and our empirical model. Section IV includes a discussion of
our results followed by our conclusions in Section V.
II.

Different organizational forms
Since our focus is on executive compensation across different organizational forms of
small businesses, we begin with a discussion of the characteristics associated with S-

' We do not discuss the characteristics of sole proprietorships because, while this organizational form is present in
the survey data, none of the sole proprietorships provide the accounting data from the survey questions necessary
to be included in this study. Similarly, partnerships do not provide sufficient compensation data to be included in
this study.
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corporations and C-corporations. Drawing on the differences in firm structure, we describe the
theoretical arguments that may predict compensation contracts across these different
organizational forms. Then we discuss firm performance measures available for small
businesses.
2.1
Characteristics of different organizational forms
A corporation is a legal entity created by a state that is distinct from its owners and
managers, has unlimited life, ease o f transferability of ownership and limited liability. Scorporation, as defined by Subchapter S in the Internal Revenue Code, is a federal income tax
election made by a corporation by filing a form with the IRS. Otherwise, the S-corporation is
formed in the same manner as a C-corporation under state law. The election is limited to firms
that currently have 100 or fewer stockholders for tax years beginning in 2004 (per CCH
Business Owners Toolkit). In 1993, the date of our sample, the restriction was for 35 or fewer
stockholders (Denis and Sarin, 2002). S-corporate status requires the corporation to be
domestic and the firm may issue only one class of stock. Subchapter S shareholders may not be
nonresident aliens or a nonhuman entity. After the ownership restrictions, an S-corporation can
be considered a hybrid organizational form that combines characteristics o f a regular
corporation and a partnership. Unhke a C-corporation, an S-corporation does not pay corporate
income tax, but instead passes all of its income on to the stockholders for payment of taxes in a
manner similar to a partnership. The income of a S corporation is subject to only one tax, at the
individual level. Unlike the S corporation, the C corporation shareholders have the tax benefit
of deferring taxes on income retained in the firm. If earnings are not paid out as dividends,
they are not taxed at the personal level until the shareholder realizes capital gains income (e.g.,
Denis and Sarin, 2002). Therefore, the primary differences in organizational form between Scorporations and C-corporations relate to taxes and the number and type o f owners.
Given the differences and similarities between S-corporations and C-corporations, the
question becomes what determines the choice to set up the firm as a S or C corporation and
what is the appropriate compensation of the executives? Various factors such as number of
shareholders, growth opportunities, business risk, size, and lines o f business may contribute to
both the choice of organizational form and level or structure of compensation. Additional
factors likely to influence compensation include owner-manager, family ownership, and
founder status.
We expect S-corporations to have fewer shareholders given they are faced with
restrictions on the maximum number o f shareholders. Therefore, S-corporations are less likely
to have a highly diffiise ownership structure. As originally argued by Berle and Means (1932),
a diffuse ownership structure may diminish incentives to shareholders to monitor management
since the cost of monitoring likely outweighs the benefit. Since more diffuse ownership
suggests greater agency problems, tying compensation to performance may mitigate some
agency costs in more diffusely held firms. In addition, given the restriction on nimiber of
shareholders, owners that choose subchapter S status may not expect to have as great a need to
raise additional capital from new shareholders. Those choosing C-corporate status may expect
to be in need of a larger shareholder base to support expected growth. Since ownership
structure may also impact agency costs, we specify a variable defined as number of owners in
the firm.
The shareholder restriction may also suggest differences in the perceived growth
opportunities associated with the firm. If a firm has high growth opportunities, the owners may
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choose C-corporate status for the potential to draw on a larger shareholder base. Many Ccorporations draw from their employee pool to raise additional capital or to provide ownership
incentives through private stock grants? High growth opportunities have also been found to be
associated with a stronger pay-performance relation (e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and
Gaver, 1993) suggesting that C corporations may be more likely to have a stronger payperformance relation than S corporations.
Differences in firm size are likely to influence compensation level and the choice of
organizational form. One of the most well documented empirical regularities for executive
compensation is the positive relation between executive compensation and firm size (Murphy,
1999). We expect the relation to continue in small businesses. In addition, we expect small
firms to be more likely to choose S-corporate status. The smaller firms will often choose Scorporate status since the ownership restriction becomes a non-binding constraint. Also, as
argued by Plesko (1994), larger firms are likely to have more complicated financial and
ownership structures making it more difficult to meet eligibility requirements for subchapter S.^
According to Cavalluzzo and Geczy (2002), S-corporations are more attractive than Ccorporations in certain lines of business based on the Revenue Act of 1987. Plesko (1994)
provides a breakdown of S corporation returns by major industrial sector and finds that less
capital-intensive industries are more likely to convert from subchapter C to subchapter S. In
addition, accounting ratios are known to vary by industry. If firms choose to tie pay to
performance, the ratios chosen and the relation between pay and performance is likely to vary
by industry. Therefore, we expect industry may influence both the choice of organizational
form and compensation structure.
A related idea to growth opportunities is the risk of the underlying assets. If the risk
differs across the organizational forms, then the monitoring of managerial performance in the
less risky company may be easier and the need to vary compensation schemes would be
minimal. According to Smith and Watts (1992), managerial activities are easier to observe and
evaluate in more stable, less risky firms. Often business risk varies by industry and therefore,
industry may influence both the choice of organizational form and compensation structure.
Bates, Jandik and Lehn (2000) find that family-owned firms pay less than non-family
owned firms. The difference is primarily driven by lower pay to the top executive. We expect
family ownership to be negatively related to the level of compensation for privately-held firms.
In addition, we expect family members to more closely monitor management reducing the
agency conflict and potentially weakening the relation between compensation and performance.
The owner/managers will have more discretion in terms of how to compensate
themselves. The owner/managers of a C corporation are likely to choose higher wages and no
dividends since C corporations are subject to double taxation of dividends. In the zero agency
cost case where we have a 1 0 0 % owner manager, the owner manager reaps all the benefits from
his or her efforts (Ang, Cole and Lin, 2000). In firms with lower agency costs, we would
expect higher salaries for owner managers due to a more efficient utilization of assets.

^ Unfortunately, we can not measure this type o f stock ownership in our sample since these are privately held firms
and do not provide the information necessary to value non-traded privately held stock.
^ As stated in the CCH Business Owner’s Toolkit, the requirements for electing S corporate status do not explicitly
limit the status to small corporations in terms of revenue. However, the other requirements such as the corporation
must be domestic, only one class of stock, and shareholders may not be a nonresident alien or a nonhuman entity
may limit larger corporations ability to elect S-corporate status. See the specific criteria outlined in the Internal
Revenue Code, Sections 1361 and 1371.
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Founder status may also influence compensation level. Chung and Pruitt (1996)
estimate a system of equations with founder/founders family dummy variables included in their
compensation equation and find that founding CEOs or their family successors tend to receive
less cash compensation than their non-founder counterparts, although the statistical significance
o f the relation is weak. Therefore, we do not have a clear prior on the sign for this variable but
control for founder status in our regressions.
Finally, competition in the labor market also influences compensation. To broadly
control for competition in the labor market, we control for firms operating in a metropolitan
statistical area (MSA). We expect firms operating in an MSA to pay higher levels of
compensation than those firms operating in rural areas.
2.2.
Measures of performance
Since both S corporations and C corporations have unlimited life and limited liability of
owners, owners may not actively participate in the operations or decision making of the
business. Owners with a limited role in the business will likely use output based accounting
measures to provide information regarding the actions of the managers. Holmstrom (1979)
argues that noisy measures of performance can provide useful information to owners in order to
determine appropriate levels of compensation for the corporation’s managers.
Typical proxies for executive performance for large publicly traded firms include stock
price performance and accounting based measures of firm performance. However, for small
privately-held firms the market value of stock prices are typically not available and therefore,
the focus on performance is restricted to an analysis based on the firm's financial statements.
The primary accounting measures of firm performance are profitability ratios, which measure
how efficiently firm operations are managed to generate net income. We choose to use ROA,
defined as net income divided by total assets, as our profitability ratio because it is the most
commonly used performance measure in academic research to establish a pay for performance
relation (e.g., Ke et al., 1999; Blackwell et al., 1994).
One caveat to privately held corporations utilizing ROA as the measure of firm
performance is that previous research suggests that privately held firms more aggressively
manage taxes (Beatty and Harris, 1999; Mikhail, 1999) and therefore, are less concerned with
the overall net income reported. To the extent that privately held firms more aggressively
manage taxes, ROA will be lower. Utilizing ROA as the measure o f performance reduces the
incentive to manage taxes since lowering taxes through lower earnings before taxes are
associated with lower net income and therefore, lower levels of compensation. Therefore, as
noted by Ke et al., we would be less likely to observe privately-held firms utilizing ROA as a
firm performance measure for compensation purposes.
Also, since the owners are taxed differently in the different organizational forms
available to small businesses, the firm performance measure related to executive compensation
may vary across organizational forms based on the taxation of the owner. Since profits flow
through to the individual owners of S-corporations, owners may have a greater incentive to
engage in expense preference behavior to shelter income from taxation than managers of Ccorporations. Since C-corporations are faced with the double taxation of dividends, the
incentive to owner-managers of C-corporations is to receive cash flow payouts through
compensation as opposed to dividends. Both the potential expense preference behavior of Scorporations and the higher salaries for C corporations to avoid dividend distributions will
reduce EBIT and similarly reduce ROA for small firms. Accordingly, alternative measures of
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firm performance, other than operating performance or ROA, may be more relevant in S and C
corporations.
Although not typically used in compensation research for large publicly traded firms,
asset management ratios such as total asset turnover measure how efficiently the firm uses its
assets to generate sales. Ang et al. (2000) argue that agency costs are inversely related to the
total asset turnover ratio. They argue that managers, for example, may make poor investment
decisions and/or exert insufficient effort, which results in lower revenues. We argue that by
establishing a relation between total asset turnover and compensation, owners may be able to
mitigate some agency c o s t s . I n addition, total asset turnover is an accounting measure that is
devoid of tax effects and is measured prior to any expense preference behavior.
In general, we expect small firms to utilize total asset turnover rather than ROA in
evaluating performance for compensation purposes. In addition, in situations where the agency
problems are less pronounced such as when the small firm is more closely held or has an owner
manager, we would expect either less reliance on accounting measures of firm performance or
more reliance on total asset turnover relative to ROA. Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) argue that the
difference in total asset turnover between a firm whose manager is the sole equity owner and a
firm whose manager owns less than 1 0 0 % of equity, measures agency costs that result from the
loss in revenues attributable to inefficient asset utilization.
The pay-performance relation should reflect the ability of managers to generate cash
flows for investors (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990 and Smith and Watts, 1992). The empirical
question becomes which performance measure is a better proxy of cash flows for investors in
small firms. We consider both ROA and total asset turnover as alternative proxies for
measuring firm performance in privately held firms.
III.

Data, methods, and descriptive statistics
3.1. Data
We obtain our data from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances
(NSSBF), co-sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board and the U.S. Small Business
Administration. According to the Methodology Report (1996) by Price Waterhouse, the
NSSBF report is one of the most comprehensive general-purpose databases on small businesses
available in the public domain.^ The 1993 NSSBF provides information fi*om 5,356 completed
interviews of a stratified random sample of small businesses operating with fewer than 500 fiilltime equivalent employees. Price Waterhouse reports that the data contain 4,637 usable
responses to the survey. We exclude from the sample: (1) not-for-profit businesses, (2)
government agencies, and (3 ) depository institutions (or non-deposit credit institutions) and any
firms that have insufficient data based on our specified regression variables.^
After our initial data restrictions, we also analyze the data for outliers and
comparability. We find that the number of shareholders in the initial C corporation sub-sample
^ A positive relation between compensation and total asset turnover would also be consistent with Welles (1995)
who provides survey evidence from small business owners that suggests the owners rely more heavily on sales in
determining compensation levels.
^ See the web site http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss for information on the NSSBF report and the
corresponding database. Although a 1998 NSSBF survey is available on the website, it does not have the same
compensation data available that is included in this study.
^ For our purposes, excluding depository institutions and government entities is important since Smith and Watts
(1992) and Gaver and Gaver (1993) argue that regulated firms have systematically different compensation
schemes due to their restricted investment opportunity sets.
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ranged from 1 to 9,000. However, only a few C corporations have over 1,000 shareholders
with most firms having less than 200 shareholders. As noted in Table I, approximately five
percent of the initial C corporations in the sample have over thirty shareholders. Also, seventy
seven and seventy two percent of the S and C corporations have less than four owners,
respectively. To avoid including firms that we suspect are systematically different than other
firms in the sample, we restrict our sample to firms with thirty or less owners. The resulting
sample size is 1,825 firms with 707 S-corporations and 1,118 C corporations. The survey data
include detailed information regarding owner and organizational demographics, sources of
financial services, income and expenses and a complete balance sheet of financial data for each
firm.
3.2.
Method
Since the choice of organizational form may be considered an endogenous variable,
determined within the system of equations, we use two-stage least squares regression analysis.
Otherwise, least-squares estimates of the compensation regression parameters will be biased
and inconsistent. In order to perform the first stage of two-stage least squares, we create a new
variable to replace the problematic causal variable by choosing instrumental variables that
influence the choice of corporate form but are unrelated to compensation (e.g., Kennedy, 1992).
Therefore, we begin by motivating the choice of the instrumental variables.
The primary factors that influence the choice of corporate form are taxes, types of
shareholders a firm can have, and access to additional capital. C corporations have a broader
group of shareholders available to them to raise capital from. Therefore, a variable that may
capture a firm’s need to access capital and influence the choice of organizational form is
whether the firm offered equity to new shareholders. Although Table II shows that S
corporations are significantly more likely to raise additional capital than C corporations, C
corporations are more likely to raise the equity from new shareholders (although the difference
is not significant), expanding their shareholder base. The new equity variable is likely to be
unrelated to compensation.
Young firms may choose S-corporate status for tax purposes. According to Cavalluzzo
and Geczy (2002) and Plesko (1994), age contributes to the choice of organizational form from
a tax perspective. When a firm is in the start up phase, costs tend to be high and losses often
occur. To the extent that losses can offset income from other sources for the owners of Scorporations, they receive tax benefits from the flow through entity. All losses would stay in a
C-corporation and be carried forward to offset future corporate income. The immediate use of
losses for the owners of the S-corporation yields a higher present value of tax savings. In
addition, the greater the differential between the corporate and individual tax rates, the greater
the advantage to passing the losses through to the individual. As firms age and become more
profitable, the differential tax rates between corporate and individual income reverses the tax
benefit and increases the benefit of being taxed as a corporation. Therefore, a variable that may
capture the differential tax treatment associated with S and C corporations and influence the

^ We find that our C corporate results are sensitive to the inclusion of corporations with more than 200 owners.
Once we eliminate firms with more than 200 owners, any additional restrictions on the sample leave our results
virtually unchanged. Therefore, to provide for comparability across the organizational forms, we restrict
ownership to 30 owners which is the maximum number of owners in our sample of S-corporations. The
ownership restriction causes us to drop 61 C corporations from the sample. We also analyze total assets and total
executive salaries for outliers and eliminate four S-corporations.
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choice of organizational form is the age of the firm. S corporations are significantly younger
than C corporations as shown in Table II. Firm age has been shown to have an insignificant
relation with compensation (e.g., Cavalluzzo and Sankaraguruswamy, 2005).
In the first stage, we regress choice of organizational form on all of the predetermined
variables in the whole system including firm age and new equity. The dependent variable is a
0/1 indicator variable equal to one if the firm is organized as a C corporation and zero if the
firm is organized as a S corporation. Then, we replace the organizational form variable in the
compensation equation that follows with the fitted variable from the first model.^
The second stage equation is our compensation model where the dependent variable is
the aggregate level o f top management compensation but depends on the choice of
organizational form. Our compensation equation is similar to Ke et al. (1999) and Cavalluzzo
and Sankaraguruswamy (2005):
In (salaryi) = a + pi In(assetsi) + p2 In(agei) + p3 familyi + P4 MSAi +
p5 founderi + Pe (owner/manageri) + py number of ownersi +
Ps corporate form i + p9 performi + pio-17 industry! + £i

(1)

where assets is measured as the natural log of total assets, age is the natural log of the age of
the firm, family is a 0 / 1 indicator variable taking on the value of one if the firm has greater than
50% ownership by a single family, MSA is a 0/1 indicator variable taking on the value of one if
the firm operates in a metropolitan statistical area, founder is a 0 / 1 indicator variable taking on
the value of one if the firm is managed by a founder, owner/manager is a 0 / 1 indicator variable
taking on the value o f one if the owner manages the business, number of owners is the number
of shareholders of the corporation, corporate form is the predicted probability of a firm being
organized as a C corporation, perform is the firm performance measure and industry is a series
of 0/1 indicator variables based on one-digit SIC codes.
We estimate the model for the entire sample to determine if executive salaries in small
businesses are associated with firm performance. We are restricted to measuring compensation
in terms of levels as the data on compensation are for 1993. The levels model estimates the
relation between the level of compensation and performance.
3.2.1. Dependent variable
The dependent variable is the total amount of annual salary paid to all top executives of
the business. The survey question used is 'during (YEAR), what was the amount of the
officers' compensation/guaranteed payments to partners?' Therefore, the compensation variable
represents an aggregate measure of total cash compensation paid to executives. We interpret
the variable to include salary and bonus. Following Ke et al. (1999), we use the natural
logarithm of compensation in our regressions (\n(salaryi) ) .
3.2.2. Accounting-based firm performance measures
Following Ke et al. (1999) and Blackwell et al. (1994), we use ROA measured as net
income divided by total assets. We measure total asset turnover as sales divided by total assets.
Since the Du Pont equation defines ROA as the product of profit margin and total asset
^ According to Angrist and Krueger (2001), the consistency of the second stage of two stage least squares does not
hinge on getting the functional form right in the first stage. Therefore, it is not necessary to use a discrete
dependent variable model for our dummy endogenous variable, organizational form.
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turnover, we also include a measure of profit margin in our regressions to determine which
component of ROA drives any relation between ROA and executive compensation. Since
ROA, asset turnover, and profit margin ratios are known to vary across industries, we attempt
to control for these differences by including industry control variables in the regressions.
3.3.
Descriptive statistics
Table II provides descriptive statistics for the sample. Our results focus on Scorporations and C corporations. Since ratios often vary systematically by industry, we analyze
the industry composition of firms in our sample. Table II includes the SIC code breakdown of
the firms in our sample across codes 1 through 8 .^ Our sample does not contain firms from
codes 0 and 9. Despite our expectation that industry may influence both the choice of
organizational form and compensation structure, our S and C corporate samples appear to be
similarly distributed across SIC codes with the largest concentration in SIC code 5 which
includes wholesale and retail trade. The only significant difference in industry concentration is
a significantly greater percentage of the S corporate firms are concentrated in SIC code 7,
Business and Entertainment Services than C corporate firms.
Table II provides fi*equencies for the indicator variables in our model (family
ownership, founded by current owner and owner managed) and mean and medians for the
continuous variables in our model. Analyzing the indicator variables, approximately 75 percent
of the S-corporations and C corporations are family owned. Similarly, approximately 75
percent of S-corporations and C corporations are owner managed. Not shown in the table,
however, is that 58 (60) percent of the corporations (S-corporations) that are family owned are
also owner managed. This highlights the idea that a firm can be owner managed but the firm
does not necessarily have over 50 percent of the total firm ownership concentrated within the
owner manager's family. Seventy (sixty-seven) percent of S-corporations (C corporations) are
founded by the current owner.
Given that the mean and median are very different, we will focus our discussion on the
medians of the continuous variables which will likely provide a better representation of the
businesses in the sample. Table II shows that median executive salaries are significantly lower
at S-corporations ($72,000) than at C-corporations ($86,000). S-corporations are also smaller
with median total assets of $480,122 compared to median total assets of $533,915 for Ccorporations, although the difference is not significant. In general, salary levels in Table II are
consistent with the well documented positive relation between firm size and executive
compensation (Murphy, 1999). When analyzing medians, regular corporations are the largest
firms in the sample and corporate executives earn the highest salaries.
Table II also shows whether the firm is located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area. We
expect that there is more competition for business executives in an MSA than in a rural area,
which would influence executive compensation. The frequencies show that about 80% of the
businesses in each organizational form are located in an MSA. So, most of the businesses in the
sample would have competition in their immediate vicinity for executive talent.
Analyzing performance in Table II shows that median ROA is significantly higher for
S-corporations (13 percent) than for regular corporations ( 8 percent) which is consistent with
higher salaries for C corporate executives but may suggest that S corporate executives do not

^ Depository institutions are included in SIC code 6. However, as previously noted we exclude depository
institutions from our sample but include insurance, brokerage and real estate firms.

The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance & Business Ventures, Vol. 12. Iss .3

11

engage in expense preference behavior. Total asset turnover appears more consistent across the
organizational forms ranging from 3.12 to 3.25.
The statistics in Table II show that the S-corporations in this sample tend to be smaller,
younger, with stronger accounting performance measures than C corporations.
VI.

Results
As previously stated, our goals for this study are twofold. First, we analyze whether a
relation exists between total executive pay in small businesses and accounting-based firm
performance measures. Second, we determine if the relation between pay and performance
varies across the different organizational forms available to small businesses.
4.1.
Entire sample
We report our second stage regression results from estimating equation (1) on the entire
sample of small businesses in Table III. Although we include industry controls in all model
specifications, we suppress the coefficients for brevity. The first column of results includes
only the control variables and the corporate form indicator variable as independent variables.
The second column of results includes the control variables, corporate form variable and ROA.
Finally, based on the Du Pont analysis, we decompose ROA between profit margin and total
asset turnover in the third column. The regression with only the control variables has
substantial explanatory power. We find a positive and significant relation between executive
salaries and firm size, if the firm operates in a metropolitan area, if the firm is owner managed,
the founder is the owner manager and the ownership is more diffuse. Consistent with Bates,
Jandik and Lehn (2000), we find a negative and significant relation between executive salaries
and family ownership. Our results suggest that owner/managers provide higher executive
compensation in small businesses while firms that have over 50 percent family ownership pay
lower executive salaries, ceteris paribus. The corporate form variable suggests that C
corporations pay higher executive salaries than S corporations.
When we include accounting based measures of firm performance in the compensation
equations, both ROA and total asset turnover are significant and positive. This suggests that
better firm performance and more efficient asset utilization is associated with higher executive
salaries, ceteris paribus, in a broad-based sample of small businesses. The positive relation
between the performance ratios and executive salaries in small privately-held businesses is
particularly important because it suggests that small firms link the level of executive
compensation to firm performance. This result is in direct contrast to the results reported in Ke
et al. (1999). They find no relation between levels of CEO pay and ROA in privately-held
insurance companies, which they interpret to suggest that privately-held firms use subjective
measures to evaluate executive performance for determining executive compensation. We
argue that Ke et al.'s findings may be specific to the insurance industry and are not
generalizable to a broad based sample of privately held small firms.
4.2.
Results for interacting organizational form and firm performance
To analyze whether organizational form impacts the use of accounting based firm
performance measures in compensation practices, Table III also reports the second stage results
from estimating equation ( 1 ) by introducing interaction variables between the corporate
organizational form and each firm performance proxy. We find that the interaction variable
between ROA and corporate form is insignificant in column four suggesting that executives’
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salaries in both S-corporations and C corporations are equally sensitive to ROA. The
sensitivity of executive compensation to ROA is equivalent across organizational forms.
Alternatively, the interaction variable between asset turnover and corporate form in column
five is negative and significant suggesting that C corporations executive compensation
packages are significantly less sensitive to the efficient use of assets relative to executive
compensation packages for S corporations.^^ A test of the joint significance of the coefficient
on asset turnover and the interaction term is significantly different from zero.
Since Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) argue that agency costs are inversely related to total
asset turnover and S corporations have higher total asset turnover, on average, than C
corporations as illustrated in Table II, the stronger relation between executive compensation
packages and total asset turnover for S corporations may result from greater agency costs in S
corporations. This result seems counter intuitive if C corporations are perceived to have greater
growth opportunities than S corporations. Theory suggests firms with greater growth
opportunities will have a stronger pay-performance relation. Given that S corporations tend to
be younger, smaller firms than C corporations, S corporations may simply have more potential
to grow since they start from a smaller base.
To fiarther analyze the difference between S and C corporation compensation practices,
we compute predicted executive compensation levels from both model 2 and model 5 of Table
III. We begin by setting all of the significant continuous independent variables equal to their
mean values. Then we assume our significant indicator variables are all equal to one which
assumes the firm is family owned, owner managed, the current owner is the founder and the
firm operates in a metropolitan area. To provide information across alternative organizational
forms, we analyze executive salaries assuming the predicted value for being organized as a C
corporation is equal to the 10*^ 50*^ and 90^^ percentile values of 0.524, 0.613 and 0.704,
respectively. We chose these values to capture the impact of an increased or decreased
likelihood of being organized as a C corporation. We similarly allow the performance metrics
to vary across the distribution of performance observed in the sample. We set the performance
variables equal to the 5^^, 50^^ and 95^^ percentile values calculated for the sample firms.
Panel A of Table IV reports the estimates of executive salaries fi*om model 2 in Table
III utilizing ROA as the performance measure. Analyzing executive salaries for the median
predicted probability for corporate status of .61 (column 2 ), we estimate an executive salary
level equal to $185,880 for the median ROA in the sample. If we allow ROA to increase to the
95‘*" percentile, executive salaries increase to $202,622, a percentage increase of 9%. If ROA
decreases to the 5^*^ percentile, executive salaries fall to $180,596, a decline of 2.8%. This
suggests some downward rigidity to executive wages. Given that the interactive term is
insignificant, the variation in executive salaries is constant across alternative predicted
probabilities for C corporate status. However, if a firm has a higher probability of being
organized as a C corporation, executive salaries are substantially higher. For example, for
median ROA firms, executive salaries range from $155,920 to $222,204 as the predicted
probability of being organized as a C corporation rises from 0.52 to 0.70. These results
illustrate the magnitude of the pay differential between executives of C versus S corporations.
Similarly, panel B of Table IV reports executive salaries calculated from model 5 of
Table III utilizing total asset turnover as the performance measure. Analyzing executive
Recall, that the corporate form indicator variable in the first stage regression equals 1 for a C corporation and 0
for a S corporation. The first stage regression estimated the fitted value associated with the probability of the firm
being organized as a C corporation.
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salaries for the median predicted probability for corporate status of .61 (column 2 ), we estimate
an executive salary level equal to $185,978 for the median level of total asset turnover in the
sample. If we allow total asset turnover to increase to the 95^*^ percentile, executive salaries
increase to $231,418, a percentage increase of 24.4%. If total asset turnover decreases to the 5**^
percentile, executive salaries fall to $178,332, a decline of 4.1%. The results in panel B of
Table IV similarly illustrate the downward rigidity of wages for executives but also illustrate
the greater sensitivity of compensation to total asset turnover relative to ROA for small firm
executives. Allowing the predicted probability for C corporate status to vary from the 10“^ to
90^*^ percentile illustrates the non-constant effect of changes in total asset turnover on executive
compensation for executives. A greater probability for C corporate status reduces the
sensitivity of wages to total asset turnover for privately held firms.
4.3.
Results for independent analysis of alternative organizational forms
The two-stage least squares analysis constrains the slope coefficients of the
determinants of executive compensation to be the same in both organizational forms.
Assuming predictions of agency theory apply to both organizational forms, this is not a
problem. However, it limits the ability to determine whether different firm characteristics are
more relevant in different organizational forms. Therefore, we also provide an analysis of
executive compensation in small businesses without controlling for the endogeneity of
organizational form.
To determine the influence of additional firm characteristics on the sensitivity of
executive compensation to performance in small privately held firms, we separate our firms
based on C versus S corporate status. Since our results for total asset turnover indicate
compensation practices differ across organizational forms, we show the results in Table V
using total asset turnover as our proxy for firm performance.
Table V shows that the sensitivity of executive compensation to the efficient use of
assets is lower for firms that have a current owner that is the founder independent of
organizational form. This result is consistent with lower agency costs in firms that have owners
who are founders of the firm. In C corporations, we find that the sensitivity of executive
compensation to the efficient use of assets is greater for firms who are owner managed (with a
coefficient estimate of 0 .0 1 1 ) but lower for firms with greater than fifty percent family
ownership (with a coefficient estimate of -0.012). Thus, if a C corporation has both an owner
manager and is family owned, the net effect on the relation between compensation and total
asset turnover is virtually zero. Column one of Table V shows that the interaction variables for
owner manager and family ownership are insignificant for S corporations.
V-

Conclusions
In this paper we examine the hypothesis that the organizational form of small
businesses influences the relation between executive compensation and alternative measures of
firm performance. We draw on Holmstrom's (1979) argument that under conditions where
complete monitoring is possible, the first best compensation contract (solution) will pay a fixed
salary if the action desired is taken. If complete monitoring is impossible or prohibitively
costly, then the second best solution suggests using imperfect estimators of an agent's actions.
We employ total asset turnover and return on assets as potential proxies for an agent's actions
and assess the relation between these proxies and executive compensation in S-corporations
and C corporations.
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Using a broad-based sample of small businesses from the 1993 National Survey of
Small Business Finances, we find that firm size is positively related to executive salaries. This
is consistent with the idea that larger organizations require more qualified executives due to the
complexity of the job. In addition, small businesses, in general, use accounting-based firm
performance measures in determining their executive compensation. We find a positive
relation between both ROA and total asset turnover and executive compensation. The relation
between total asset turnover and executive salaries is weaker for C corporations than for S
corporations. In addition, executive salaries are positively related to more diffuse ownership,
owner managers, the founder is the current owner but negatively related to firms with greater
than fifty percent family ownership. Additional analysis of compensation practices for S and C
corporations reveals that the sensitivity of compensation to total asset turnover is lower for
firms with a current owner that is a founder independent of the organizational form. Within the
sample of firms organized as C corporations, the sensitivity of compensation to total asset
turnover is greater for firms that are owner managed but less sensitive for firms with greater
than fifty percent family ownership.
By establishing a relation between total asset turnover and executive compensation,
owners of privately held firms may be able to mitigate some agency costs. As argued by Ang
et al (2000), agency costs are inversely related to total asset turnover. In general, we find that
privately held firms appear to structure executive compensation in a manner consistent with
aligning the interests of owners and managers to maximize the cash flows o f the firm.
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Table I
Number of Owners in the full sample of
S-Corporations and C>Corporations
Number of Owners
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11-15
16-20
21-25
26-30
31-100
More than 100
Total sample

S-Corporation
207
29%
250
35%
94
13%
54
8%
32
5%
26
4%
10
1%
6
1%
0%
1
7
1%
12
2%
2
0%
4
1%
2
0%
na
na
707
100%

C-Corporation
354
343
154
95
47
26
13
10
9
9
30
15
8
5
28
33
1179

30%
29%
13%
8%
4%
2%
1%
1%
1%
1%
3%
1%
1%
0%
2%
3%
100%
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Table II
Means (medians) of variables by type of corporation and for the full sample. We report the
statistics for the raw numbers in this table without adjusting for natural logarithm.

Variable
Executive Salaries
Total assets ($’s)
Firm age (years)
Family owned
MSA
Founder Owner
New equity
New shareholders
Owner managed
Number of owners
Profit Margin
Asset Turnover (times)
ROA
SIC= 1
SIC = 2
SIC = 3
SIC = 4
SIC = 5
SIC = 6
SIC = 7
SIC = 8

S-Corporation
N=707

C-Corporation
N=1118

Differences in
Means (Medians)

171,870
(72,000)
2,223,013
(480,122)
15.43
(11.0)
78.50%
81.61%
70.30%
23.34%
3.25%
76.66%
2.90
(2.0)
7.45%
(4.78%)
5.88
(3.25)
0.47
(0.13)
11.32%
8.35%
8.63%
3.54%
33.38%
5.80%
17.54%
11.46%

178,224
(86,000)
2,121,491
(533,915)
17.80
(14.0)
75.58%
84.79%
67.62%
18.52%
4.83%
75.67%
3.23
(2.0)
5.77%
(2.63%)
5.89
(3.12)
0.38
(0.08)
13.06%
7.33%
10.11%
5.01%
33.63%
5.81%
11.54%
13.51%

-0.46
(-2.34**)
0.47
(-0.70)
-3 47***
(-5.62***)
1.43
-1.79*
1.20
2.49**
-1.63
0.48
-2.01**
(-0.20)
1.17
(5.35***)
-0.01
(1.22)
0.84
(4.52***)
-1.10
0.79
-1.05
-1.49
-0.11
-0.01
3.62***
-1.28

Note; Executive Salaries equals total compensation for business executives. Family Owned equals one if 50% of
the firm’s equity is owned by one family, 0 otherwise. MSA equals one if the firm operates in a metropohtan
statistical area, 0 otherwise. Founder Owner equals one if the firm is founded by current owner, 0 otherwise. New
Equity equals one if the firm has issued new equity, 0 otherwise. New shareholders equals one if the firm has
issued equity to new shareholders, 0 otherwise. Owner managed equals one if the owner manages the business
operations, 0 otherwise. Profit Margin equals net income divided by sales. Asset Turnover equals sales divided by
total assets. ROA equals net income divided by total assets. Industry designations include: SIC=1 for Mineral and
Construction; SIC=2 and 3 for Manufacturing; SIC=4 for Transportation, Communications, and Utilities; SIC=5
for Wholesale and Retail Trade; SIC=6 for Insurance, and Real Estate (exclude Financial Services); SIC=7 for
Business and Entertainment Services; SIC=8 for Health, Legal, Educational, and Social Services. The test statistics
reported in the last column are the t-statistics for differences in means or z-statistics for differences in medians for
a two-sided test. For the 0/1 indicator variables the test is the Wilcoxon two-sample test with reported z-statistics.
■ \ and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively.
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Table III
Two stage least squares regressions of the natural logarithm of total salary of top managers for
a sample of 1825 small firms. Only the second stage equation results are shown. The models
differ based on the proxy for firm performance and including interaction terms between the
firm performance variable and the organizational form indicator variable.
Models
Intercept
ln(total assets)

1
4.342***
(15.25)
0.435***

(33-15)
Family owned
MSA
Founder
Owner
managed
Number of
Owners
Corporate form

-0.166***
(-3.02)
0.180***
(2.74)
0.158***
(3.09)
0.155***
.
0.015**
(2.28)
1.738***
(3.67)

ROA

4.100***
(14.19)
0.444***
(33.56)
-0.169***
(-3.07)
0.154***
(2.35)
0.167***
(3-28)
0.153***
(2-94)
0.014**
(2-04)
1.965***
. (4.14)
0.039***
(4.29)

ROA * Corp
form
Profit Margin

_( , ),

4.080***
(14.11)
0.446***
(33.57)
-0.167***
(-3.03)
0.155***
(2-36)
0.167***
(3.28)

0154***
(2.96)
0.014**

(2-.Q1.)....
1 958***

_ ill^

0.013***
(9.46)

140.42***
0.478

132.28***
0.483

3.672***
(12.91)
0.478***
(35.56)
-0.155***
(-2.89)
0.158***
(2.48)
0.152***
(3-06)
0.167***
(3-28)
0.013**

_1L20L
1.750***
(3.80)

0.057***
(3.43)
-0.026
(1-33)
0.055
(0.75)

Profit Margin*
Corp form
Asset turnover
Asset Turnover
*Corp form
F-statistic
Adjusted R-sq.

3.836***
(13.55)
0.467***
(35.24)
-0.158***
i2 94 _
0.160***
- (2.48)
0.153***
(3.06)
0.170***
(3-33)
0.014**
.(2:04)....
1.752***
(3.79)

132.64***
0.503

123.01***
0.483

0.145
(1.27)
-0.151
(-1-04)
0.025***
(7.96)
-0.013***
(-4.07)
118.29***
0.507

Note: Family Owned equals one if 50% of the firm’s equity is owned by one family, 0 otherwise. MSA equals one
if the firm operates in a metropolitan statistical area, 0 otherwise. Founder equals one if the firm is founded by
current owner, 0 otherwise. Owner managed equals one if the owner manages the business operations, 0
otherwise. Corporate form equals the predicted value from the first stage regression that predicts the probability
that a sample firm will be organized as a C corporation or S corporation. ROA equals net income divided by total
assets. Profit Margin equals net income divided by sales. Asset Turnover equals sales divided by total assets.
Industry controls based on one-digit SIC codes are included in all regressions but not reported for brevity.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively.
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Table IV
Sensitivity of executive compensation to changes in firm performance for various predicted
probabilities associated with organizational form
Predicted Probability for C corporate
status (10^^, 50^*", 90^^ percentile)
Panel A: ROA
% decrease in compensation
5 percentile of ROA (-0.65)
Median ROA (0.09)
95^^ percentile of ROA (2.31)
% increase in compensation
Panel B: Total Asset Turnover
% decrease in compensation
5^*^percentile of TAT (0.71)
Median Total Asset Turnover (3.18)
95^*^ percentile of TAT (16.01)
% increase in compensation

0.52

0.61

0.70

-0.028
151487
155920
169963
0.090

-0.028
180596
185880
202622
0.090

-0.028
215888
222204
242217
0.090

-0.044
152620
159620
201606
0.263

-0.041
178332
185978
231418
0.244

-0.038
208882
217203
266209
0.226

Note: The analysis above assumes all significant continuous variables equal the mean value in the full sample and
the significant dichotomous variables are all set equal to one. Therefore, the values above assume that the firm is
owner managed, the current owner is the founder, the firm is family owned and the firm operates in a metropohtan
area. The predicted probability for C corporate status is based on the results fi*om the first stage in the two-stage
least squares analysis employed to account for the endogeneity o f organizational form and executive
compensation. Panel A reports results for ROA based on model 2 from Table III. Panel B reports results for Total
Asset Turnover (TAT) based on model 5 from Table III.
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Table V
Least squares regressions of the natural logarithm of total salary of top managers for a sample
of 707 S-corporations and 1118 C-corporations.
Models
Intercept
ln(total assets)
Family owned
MSA
Founder
Owner
managed
Number of
Owners
Profit Margin
Asset turnover
(TAT)
TAT * family
TAT * founder
TAT * owner
managed
TAT * number
of owners
F-statistic
Adjusted R-sq.

S corps
3.340***
(10.37)
0.546***
(26.74)
-0.003
(-0.03)
0.256***
( 2 .88 )
0.463***
(4-39)
0.106
( 1.11)
-0.003

C corps

4 21
(15.45)
0.503***
(29.21)
-0.248***

_(:.3-41)
0.210* *

(2-84)
0.261

(3-54)
0.157**
(2-41)
0.006

(- 0 .20 )

iOJli

0.214*
( 1.86)
0.082***

-0.030
(-0-34)
0.061***
(4.43)
- 0 .012 *

(4-11)
0.005
(0.76)
-0.063***
(-3.65)
0.001
(0.13)
0.004

1L44I
53.04***
0.556

-0.048***

(-4-58)
0.011

(3.05)
0.003

IL M I
72.08
0.520

Note: Family Owned equals one if 50% of the firm’s equity is owned by one family, 0 otherwise. MSA equals one
if the firm operates in a metropolitan statistical area, 0 otherwise. Founder equals one if the firm is founded by
current owner, 0 otherwise. Owner managed equals one if the owner manages the business operations, 0
otherwise. Corporate form equals the predicted value from the first stage regression that predicts the probability
that a sample firm will be organized as a C corporation or S corporation. Profit Margin equals net income divided
by sales. Asset Turnover equals sales divided by total assets. Industry controls based on one-digit SIC codes are
included in all regressions but not reported for brevity.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively.

